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THE NON-LAWYER ATTORNEY GENERAL:  









The Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Crown.1 Among other things, they 
are “the official legal adviser of the Lieutenant Governor, and the legal member of the 
Executive Council”; “shall advise the heads of the several departments upon all 
matters of law”; and “ha[ve] the regulation and conduct of all litigation for or against 
the Crown”.2 These duties unquestionably constitute the practice of law. With some 
exceptions, the unlicensed practice of law is an offence.3 The purpose of licensing, 
along with the rest of the self-regulation of the legal profession, is to protect the public 
interest.4 Nonetheless, some Attorneys General are not licensed as lawyers, which is 
to say that they are not members of the corresponding law society. As Graham Steele 
asks, “Does it matter?”.5 More specifically, does this leave unprotected the interests of 




* Of the Ontario Bar; Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. Thanks to Adam 
Dodek, Michelle Bérubé, Kim Brooks, Richard Devlin, Senator Judith Keating, and Nicole Arski for 
comments on a draft. Thanks also to Emma Paquette at the Canadian Bar Association and Denise Fiset at 
the Canadian Bar Association (New Brunswick Branch). 
1 See e.g. Ontario v Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 at para 35: “As Chief Law 
Officer of the Crown, the Attorney General has special responsibilities to uphold the administration of 
justice”. 
2 Public Service Act, RSNS 1989, c 376, s 29(1) (a), (c), (e). The language is very similar across Canadian 
jurisdictions. See e.g. Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985, c J-2, ss 4, 5; Ministry of the Attorney General 
Act, RSO 1990, c M.17, s 5; Attorney General Act, RSBC 1996, c 22, s 2; An Act Respecting the Role of the 
Attorney General, RSNB 2011, c 116, s 2. 
3 See e.g. Legal Profession Act, SNS 2004, c 28, s 17(1)(a). 
4 See e.g. ibid, s 4(1): “The purpose of the Society is to uphold and protect the public interest in the practice 
of law.” See also e.g. Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline 
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada 1993) (loose-leaf updated 2021, release 3) at Ch 26, 26.1, p 26–1: “[t]he 
purposes of law society discipline proceedings are not to punish offenders and exact retribution, but rather 
to protect the public, maintain high professional standards, and preserve public confidence in the legal 
profession.” See also e.g. The Law Society of Manitoba v Bueti, 2018 MBLS 4 at para 4: “the purpose of a 
discipline hearing is to protect the public interest.” 
5 Graham Steele, “Is There a Lawyer in the House? The Declining Role of Lawyers in Elected Office” 
(2017) 40:4 Can Parl Rev 2 at 7, online (pdf):<www.revparl.ca/40/4/40n4e_17_steele.pdf>. 
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The long-running assumption and assertion in the case law and literature was 
that the Attorney General is not required to be a lawyer. In 2013, the BC Court of 
Appeal in Askin v Law Society of British Columbia squarely confirmed this 
assumption.6 This holding, despite its important consequences for the public interest 
and its aftermath, has been the subject of little analysis in the subsequent case law or 
literature. These consequences thus remain not only unaddressed, but also largely 
unacknowledged. 
 
In this article, I provide a legal and policy analysis of the non-lawyer Attorney 
General and recommendations for legislative change. I begin in Part 1 by setting out 
and assessing Askin and its uptake in the case law and literature. I demonstrate that 
while the decision in Askin has two major weaknesses, the reasoning is presumably 
applicable across the country.7 In Part 2, I examine the legal consequences of Askin 
and its policy or practical consequences. I argue that it threatens the government’s 
solicitor-client privilege and that it leaves the non-lawyer Attorney General 
unconstrained by the law of lawyering more broadly. Against this context, in Part 3 I 
consider options for legislative reform and propose a path forward that will solve the 
legal consequences of Askin. I recommend legislative amendments that would deem 
the non-lawyer Attorney General to be a member of the corresponding law society so 
long as they held that role. I then conclude by reflecting on the implications of my 
analysis. If nothing else, such legislative deeming would clearly identify the 
reasonable expectations of the legislature and the public, as well as signal to law 
societies that the regulation of the legal profession must unavoidably include 
regulation of the Attorney General. I also recommend the recognition of a 
constitutional convention that only lawyers be appointed as Attorney General. 
 
 
Part 1: Askin v Law Society of British Columbia and its uptake 
 
In this Part, I canvass and critique the holding and rationale in Askin and situate the 
case in the previous and subsequent legal literature and caselaw. 
 
The petitioner in Askin unsuccessfully argued that the appointment of a non-
lawyer as Attorney General was invalid and that the non-lawyer Attorney General was 
violating the prohibition against the unlicensed practice of law under the Legal 
Profession Act.8 She also argued that other provincial legislation, including legislation 
 
6 Askin v Law Society of British Columbia, 2013 BCCA 233 [Askin BCCA], aff’g 2012 BCSC 895 [Askin 
BCSC], leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35463 (7 November 2013). 
7 While the reasoning is partly reliant on a provincial statute, the relevant statutory language is not unique 
to BC. See below note 62 and accompanying text. 
8 Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at paras 1, 7; Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 11. Indeed, on appeal she argued 
not only that the Legal Profession Act, SBC 1998, c 9, required the Attorney General to be a lawyer (Askin 
BCCA at para 50), but further that the Queen’s Counsel Act, RSBC 1996, c 393, required the Attorney 
General to have been a lawyer for five years (Askin BCCA at para 47). It is unclear from the reasons in 
Askin BCSC whether she made this argument before the chambers judge. 
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on the office of the Attorney General, similarly required that the Attorney General be 
a lawyer.9 
 
The petitioner also argued, likewise unsuccessfully, that the Law Society had 
erred in its decision that it lacked “jurisdiction” to investigate her complaint against 
the non-lawyer Attorney General for unlicensed practice.10 The reaction of the Law 
Society to the decision of the Court of Appeal was that “[t]he law society is content to 
have the matter once again resolved and to have confirmation of our interpretation of 
the Legal Profession Act and other statutes.”11 
 
The core holding in Askin can be broken down into two linked propositions. 
The first is a matter of constitutional law: the unconstrained ability to appoint members 
of cabinet, including the Attorney General, is a prerogative power.12 The second 
proposition, which is a question of statutory interpretation, is that BC legislation – 
including the Legal Profession Act – had not displaced that prerogative power.13 In 
particular, the Interpretation Act deems that a statutory assignment of duties includes 
the necessary powers to fulfill those duties.14 
 
In arriving at this decision, each level of court made a notable observation. 
Justice Stromberg-Stein of the Supreme Court of BC held that, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, “statutes imposing duties on a minister of the Crown cannot be read as 
requiring that in order to perform their duties, the minister must obtain additional 
authority under a statute of general application, such as the Legal Profession Act.”15 
The Court of Appeal, considering a statutory interpretation argument applying the 
concept of necessary implication, adopted the position of the Attorney General that 
“[i]t is not necessary for the purpose of protecting the general public, the purpose of 
 
9 Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 22; Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at paras 44–45, 50. 
10 Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 12, 16, 26. 
11 Charlotte Santry, “AG doesn’t need to be a lawyer: B.C. appeal court” (8 May 2013) online: Canadian 
Lawyer Magazine <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/general/ag-doesnt-need-to-be-a-lawyer-b.c.-
appeal-court/271985> (quoting Deborah Armour, the Society’s chief legal officer). 
12 Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at paras 29–30: “The prerogative power of the Lieutenant Governor to appoint 
ministers of cabinet is of constitutional significance, and cannot be removed, replaced, qualified, or 
extinguished without express legislative language or by necessary implication…. Further, as the royal 
prerogative is a branch of the common law, the legislature would need clear and unambiguous indication 
that it intended to change it”. [Citations omitted.] See also Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 31.  
13 Legal Profession Act, supra note 8; Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at paras 22–26; Askin BCCA, supra note 
6 esp at para 50. 
14 Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 23, quoting Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, s 27(2) [BC 
Interpretation Act]: “If in an enactment power is given to a person to do or enforce the doing of an act or 
thing, all the powers that are necessary to enable the person to do or enforce the doing of the act or thing are 
also deemed to be given.” See also Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 45. 
15 Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 24. 
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the Legal Profession Act, that the person appointed to the office of Attorney General 
be a member of the Law Society, or even that the person be legally trained.”16 
 
Neither level of court otherwise engaged with the petitioner’s submissions 
that the public interest required the Attorney General to be a lawyer, i.e. that 
“[p]rinciples of the public interest in the administration of justice also militate against 
a non-lawyer holding office as Attorney General” and that “[s]erious harm to the rights 
of individual citizens of the province is a very real risk where an unqualified person is 
appointed to the office of the Attorney General.”17 
 
Although not mentioned in Askin, a similar question was superficially 
answered in the 1919 decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Rex v Nyczyk.18 The 
appellant in Nyczyk argued that the indictment was invalid because it was preferred 
under the authority of the acting Attorney General, who was not a lawyer.19 However, 
the Court held that “[t]here is nothing in the statutes that I can find requiring the 
Attorney-General to be a barrister or a solicitor, although the holder of that office 
usually is a barrister.”20 (Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate or otherwise 
support this statement with any legal analysis.) Moreover, Purdue CJM applied the 
proposition that “[i]t is a general presumption of law that a person acting in a public 
capacity is duly authorized so to do”.21 This proposition appears to parallel the 
interpretive argument in Askin that statutory duties include the power to carry out those 
duties. 
 
Similarly, MacKenzie J in Krieger v Law Society of Alberta asserted, without 
giving any support, that “an Attorney General does not have to be a lawyer”.22 
Moreover, presaging the interpretation of the BC Legal Profession Act in Askin, she 
also asserted that “the intent and purpose of that Act [the Alberta Legal Profession 
Act] is to control the standards of lawyers. It is not in any way concerned with the 
functions of the Attorney General as such.”23 While the Supreme Court of Canada 




16 Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 50. 
17 Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at paras 2(f), 2(g). 
18 Rex v Nyczyk (1919), 30 Man R 17, 31 CCC 240 (CA) [Nyczyk cited to Man R]. 
19 Ibid at 18–19. 
20 Ibid at 19, Perdue CJM. See also Cameron JA at 22: “That [the acting Attorney General] the Honourable 
T. C. Norris was not a lawyer is immaterial.” 
21 Ibid at 19 [citation omitted]. 
22 Krieger v Law Society of Alberta (1997), 149 DLR (4th) 92 at para 72, 51 Alta LR (3d) 363 (QB) [Krieger 
QB], rev’d on other grounds 2000 ABCA 255, aff’d on other grounds 2002 SCC 65 [Krieger SCC]. 
23 Krieger QB, supra note 22 at para 72; Legal Profession Act, SA 1990, c L-9.1. 
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The assumption in almost all of the literature prior to Askin was that the 
Attorney General was not required to be a lawyer. For example, David Kilgour wrote 
in 1979 that “[t]he Attornies General of both our federal and provincial governments 
need not be lawyers but invariably have been since one’s mind runneth not to the 
contrary.”24 Similarly, Grant Huscroft in 1995 noted that “[i]n Canada, however, it is 
clear not only that the Attorney General might not be the best lawyer; the Attorney 
General might not be a lawyer at all.”25 However, neither Kilgour nor Huscroft cited 
any legal support for their assertions, instead merely observing the fact that non-
lawyers had occasionally been appointed as Attorneys General.26 As noted by Michael 
B. Murphy, former Attorney General for New Brunswick, this fact is “irrelevant…. 
[t]he appointments simply have not been challenged.”27  
 
A more nuanced position was taken on behalf of the New Brunswick Branch 
of the Canadian Bar Association in 1987: “Given the nature of these duties and 
functions [of the Attorney General] it will be seen that only in exceptional 
circumstances could the office be discharged by one who is not a lawyer.”28 
Unfortunately this assertion was not explained. In particular, there was no indication 
of what might qualify as such “exceptional circumstances”.29 Neither was it clear 
whether the assertion was squarely one of law or one of policy, or both. 
 
Many decades before any of this literature, however, W. Kent Power in a 
1939 note in the Canadian Bar Review squarely considered the arguments that the 
Attorney General must be a lawyer as a matter of law and policy.30 Power’s motivation 
was the appointment of a non-lawyer Attorney General for Alberta in 1937, which 
Power identifies as likely the first such non-lawyer Attorney General in Canadian 
history.31 Intriguingly, Power’s legal analysis largely foreshadowed Askin. Like the 
applicant in Askin, Power recognized a legal argument based on the legislation 
governing the practice of law and the office of the Attorney General – but, like the 
courts in Askin, he recognized the impact of the prerogative power (the scope of which 
 
24 David Kilgour, “Editorial Note to Lord Hailsham’s “Lecture on the Law Officers and the Lord 
Chancellor”” (1979) 17:2 Alta L Rev 141 at 141. 
25 Grant Huscroft, “The Attorney General and Charter Challenges to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator?” 
(1995) 5 NJCL 125 at 134. (Now Huscroft JA of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.) 
26 Kilgour, supra note 24 at 141 (EC Manning, Alberta, 1955); Huscroft, supra note 25 at 135 note 36 (James 
MacRae, Manitoba, 1988; Marion Boyd, Ontario, 1993). 
27 Michael B Murphy QC, “The Case for an Unelected and Independent Attorney General” (November 
2013) Solicitors’ J 1 at 10 [on file with author]. 
28 Hon Charles JA Hughes et al, “The Future of the Office of Attorney-General in New Brunswick” (1988) 
37 UNBLJ 190 at 190 [Hughes et al]. 
29 Ibid at 190. 
30 W Kent Power, “The Office of Attorney General” (1939) 17:6 Can Bar Rev 416. 
31 Ibid at 416. 
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power he described as being “very nebulous” at the time).32 Also like Askin, Power 
suggested that as a matter of policy, a non-lawyer Attorney General would not be 
capable of effectively performing the duties of office and would thus endanger the 
public interest (in Power’s words, “the public welfare”).33 
 
The uptake of Askin in the subsequent legal literature and the case law has 
been minimal. Only two cases have applied it, and they have only done so for fairly 
narrow propositions that are far from unique to Askin. The Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench has relied on Askin for the proposition that “[i]n order to amend Crown 
Prerogative, the Legislature must express its intent in a clear and unambiguous 
manner”.34 Similarly, the BC Supreme Court has cited Askin, among other decisions, 
in holding that “[t]he object of the Legal Profession Act is the protection of the 
public”.35 
 
The few commentators that have cited Askin have at most critiqued its result 
but not its reasoning. Adam Dodek described Askin as “surprising[g]” and “strange”.36 
However, he went no further. Indeed, he wrote soon after that “[p]remiers have the 
power and the right to appoint non-lawyers as their chief legal advisers.”37 Similarly, 
while Graham Steele observed that “[w]hen the Attorney General is not a lawyer, one 
may wonder in what meaningful sense he or she can offer legal advice to the 
government,”38 he did not argue that Askin was problematic or wrong. Likewise, in 
analyzing the application of solicitor-client privilege to the non-lawyer Attorney 
General, I myself applied Askin without any critique.39 
 
 
32 Ibid at 418–422. See esp 422: “that contention brings us again into that very nebulous realm of the scope 
of the royal prerogative”. 
33 Ibid at 424–429. 
34 Engel v Alberta (Executive Council), 2019 ABQB 490 at para 32. But see below note 51 on displacement 
of a prerogative power by necessary implication. 
35 Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP v Cardero Resource Corp, 2014 BCSC 892 at para 18. 
36 Adam Dodek, “The Curious Case of the Non-Lawyer Attorney General: White Tiger of the Legal System” 
(29 May 2013), online (blog): SLAW <www.slaw.ca/2013/05/29/the-curious-case-of-the-non-lawyer-
attorney-general-white-tiger-of-the-legal-system/> [Dodek, “White Tiger”]: “It seems strange that the 
occupant of the highest legal office of the province could be a non-lawyer. It seems strange further still that 
this person is charged by statute with many important legal responsibilities, including acting as the official 
legal adviser to the Lieutenant Governor and to the Cabinet.” See also Omar Ha-Redeye, “Possibilities 
Under a Non-Lawyer AG in Ontario” (1 July 2018), online (blog): SLAW 
<www.slaw.ca/2018/07/01/possibilities-under-a-non-lawyer-ag-in-ontario/>: “it may seem as an 
inconsistency”. 
37 Adam Dodek, “Does Solicitor-Client Privilege Apply to an Attorney-General Who Is Not a Lawyer?” (6 
August 2013), online (blog): SLAW <www.slaw.ca/2013/08/06/does-solicitor-client-privilege-apply-to-an-
attorney-general-who-is-not-a-lawyer/> [Dodek, “Solicitor-Client Privilege”]. 
38 Steele, supra note 5 at 7. 
39 Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney General as Lawyer (?): Confidentiality upon Resignation from 
Cabinet” (2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 147 at 166–169 [Martin, “Confidentiality”]. 
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Notably, the commentators who have more fully critiqued Askin have all 
come out of the government of New Brunswick: government lawyer Eric Boucher, 
former Deputy Attorney General Judith Keating, and former Attorney General 
Michael B. Murphy.40 In his analysis of the role of the Attorney General as “lore 
master” of the rule of law, Boucher expressed in passing “grave concern” with Askin.41 
In an unpublished speech that drew on an article by Murphy, Keating similarly 
characterized Askin as “a most unfortunate case”.42 Murphy went further, writing that 
the holding in Askin “defies all logic”.43 Like Murphy, Keating argued that “[t]he 
powers of the Executive Council Office to appoint a minister and assign responsibility, 
and the constitutional imperative for appointing the chief legal advisor are not 
mutually exclusive, and to accept such a proposition is to negate the fundamental role 
of the Attorney General and along with it the proper application of the rule of law.”44 
Indeed, Keating ranks non-lawyer Attorneys General as “[the] most flagrant erosion 
of the role of the Attorney General”,45 and ultimately characterizes the appointment of 
non-lawyer Attorneys General as a failure of the responsibility, and even the legal 
duty, of the Premiers who appoint them.46 She called on lawyers, the Canadian Bar 
Association, and the law societies to engage on this issue.47 Boucher likewise called 
on law societies to do so: 
 
My hope is also that law societies will be compelled to deal with the problem 
of non-lawyer Attorneys General. By stressing the importance of appointing 
only practicing lawyers to the top legal job of the jurisdiction, hopefully law 
societies will be in a better position to impress upon government the 
importance of its role as guardian of the rule of law and of the Attorney 
General's role as its Lore Master.48 
 
40 Recall also here the earlier view of the New Brunswick Branch of the Canadian Bar Association that the 
Attorney General should be a lawyer absent undefined “exceptional circumstances”: Hughes et al, supra 
note 28. 
41 Eric Pierre Boucher, “Civil Crown Counsel: Lore Masters of the Rule of Law” (2018) 12 JPPL 463 at 
483. Boucher here echoed the “grave concern” of Judith Keating, then a former Deputy Attorney General 
for New Brunswick and now Senator Keating: Judith Keating, QC, “The Role of the Attorney General: A 
Crisis of Conscience” (27 April 2017), online: Canadian Bar Association, Teleconference [membership 
required]: <www.cba.org/Sections/Public-Sector-Lawyers-Forum/Resources/MP3/TeleconferenceOct-
1916-(5)> [on file with author]. 
42 Ibid at 50:05 to 50:07; Murphy, supra note 27 at 10.  
43 Murphy, supra note 27 at 12. 
44 Keating, supra note 41 at 50:43 to 51:09; Murphy, supra note 27 at 10. 
45 Keating, supra note 41 at 48:13 to 48:25. 
46 Ibid at 44.06 to 45:04: “as fiduciaries and trustees of the constitutional makeup of their respective 
jurisdictions, Premiers have an obligation to ensure that the institutions as established serve to facilitate the 
provision of independent legal advice and protect the exercise of the fundamental role of the Attorney 
General. To do otherwise, in my view, by … appointing non-lawyers as Attorneys General and non-lawyers 
as Deputies Attorney General … is to allow for the rule of law to be overridden by political imperatives.” 
47 Ibid at 59:41 to 59:50.  
48 Boucher, supra note 41 at 484. 




There is no indication, at least publicly, that law societies have fulfilled Keating’s plea 
or Boucher’s hope. In my view this is not surprising, as law societies – in contrast to, 
for example, the Canadian Bar Association and its branches – seem reticent to engage 
with such issues. Moreover, the court in Askin held that the law society was correct 
that it had no jurisdiction over the appointment of a non-lawyer Attorney General.49 
This holding would provide a defensible justification for the law societies to avoid 
addressing this problem. It is less obvious why the Canadian Bar Association appears 
not to have addressed it, at least publicly. 
 
Adam Dodek has suggested that the existence of non-lawyer Attorneys 
General is largely ignored by the profession because it is a threat to “some of the most 
fundamental assertions of the Canadian legal system”, particularly the self-regulation 
and the professional monopoly of the legal profession.50 This would be a compelling 
rationale to ignore Askin, albeit a self-serving one – although following this reasoning 
one might expect lawyers to argue that Askin was wrongly decided and that Attorneys 
General must be lawyers. 
 
As for the reasoning in Askin, it has two major weaknesses. With respect, I 
would argue that the least supported and most vulnerable conclusion by the Court of 
Appeal was that the public interest mandate of the law society does not, by necessary 
implication, grant the law society jurisdiction over the Attorney General.51 If the public 
interest requires the law society to regulate government lawyers, as the Supreme Court 
of Canada established in Krieger,52 then it is unclear as to why it would not require the 
regulation of the Attorney General as the chief government lawyer.53 (I do 
acknowledge that on a narrow reading, Krieger holds that the Law Society has this 
authority “[b]ecause Crown prosecutors must be members of the Law Society” – 
suggesting that Krieger itself does not assist in determining whether Attorneys General 
must likewise be members.)54 More detailed reasoning would have been helpful from 
the courts in Askin on this point. 
 
49 Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 26. Askin BCCA, supra note 6 notes this argument at para 23 but does 
not explicitly consider it. 
50 Dodek, “White Tiger”, supra note 36. 
51 With respect to the chambers judge, she may have overstated her holding at para 30 that “as the royal 
prerogative is a branch of the common law, the legislature would need clear and unambiguous indication 
that it intended to change it”. A prerogative power can be displaced by necessary implication. See e.g. Ross 
River Dena Council v Canada, 2002 SCC 54 at para 54, as quoted e.g. by Askin BCCA at para 32 [citations 
omitted]: “this displacement [of a prerogative power] occurs only to the extent that the statute does so 
explicitly or by necessary implication”. See also Canadian Federation of Students v Ontario, 2019 ONSC 
6658 at para 94 (Div Ct): “The Crown cannot exercise its prerogative powers in a manner contrary to 
legislation or in circumstances where legislation has displaced the Crown’s prerogative power explicitly or 
by necessary implication.” 
52 Krieger SCC, supra note 23 at para 58. 
53 Thanks to Senator Keating for inspiring this point. 
54 Krieger SCC, supra note 23 at para 4. 




The second major weakness in Askin is the assumed scope of the prerogative 
power to appoint the Attorney General. Keating and Murphy both make an important 
argument that the power to appoint the Cabinet must be interpreted alongside the duty 
of the Attorney General as chief law officer, and that the former does not trump the 
latter.55 Indeed, insofar as the Attorney General has a duty to promote and protect the 
rule of law, and the rule of law is a constitutional principle,56 the prerogative power is 
arguably constrained by that principle.57 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Krieger recognized that “the office of the Attorney General is one with constitutional 
dimensions recognized in the Constitution Act, 1867”.58 That is, there are legitimate 
constitutional reasons to require the Attorney General to be a lawyer, which reasons 
legitimately constrain the otherwise absolute discretion to appoint the Cabinet. This 
argument is about the scope of the prerogative power and not its displacement by 
statute – and thus, if accepted, renders moot the statutory interpretation issue about 
displacement, which was the focus of the Court of Appeal in Askin. Nonetheless, 
explicit legal support for this argument about the scope of the prerogative power 
appears to be lacking. In contrast, courts have zealously protected undisplaced 
prerogative powers,59 which zeal suggests that they may be unlikely to recognize an 
apparently novel constraint on the prerogative power to appoint the Attorney General. 
Unfortunately, this argument was not raised before the chambers judge or on the 
appeal.60 
 
While Askin is not binding on courts outside British Columbia, its reasoning 
would appear to be applicable elsewhere. While the first proposition – that the 
unconstrained ability to appoint members of cabinet, including the Attorney General, 
is a prerogative power – applies across Canada, the question of whether that 
prerogative power has been displaced by statute is a matter of statutory interpretation 
that could conceivably vary from province to province. Steele, for example, writes that 
“[t]he BC Court of Appeal decision relies on some very careful interpretation of 
several BC statutes, so it is not clear that the case puts the issue to rest for the rest of 
 
55 Keating, supra note 41 at 50:43 to 51:09; Murphy, supra note 27 at 10–12. 
56 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 70–71, 161 DLR (4th) 385. 
57 Murphy, supra note 27 at 10, 12. Murphy roots his rule of law argument in the preamble to the Constitution 
Act, 1982 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
58 Krieger, supra note 22 at para 26; Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, 
Appendix II, No 5. 
59 See e.g. Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 at paras 34–37. 
60 Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 11: “Ms. Askin filed a factum raising numerous grounds of appeal and 
seeking a number of orders. Counsel appeared for Ms. Askin on the hearing of the appeal, and properly 
limited the grounds of appeal and the nature of the order sought.” Even a generous reading of the appellate 
factum, however, does not reveal this particular constitutional argument. Moreover, no notice of 
constitutional question was given: Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 31. 
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Canada.”61 Nonetheless, the key provision in the BC Interpretation Act – that the 
imposition of a duty includes the powers necessary to execute that duty – is a fairly 
typical one.62 At the same time, any courts outside BC purporting to rely on or follow 
Askin as persuasive would be wise to address the two weaknesses in its reasoning 
discussed above. 
 
In her unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, Askin made the novel but intriguing and compelling argument that there is a 
Canadian constitutional convention that only lawyers be appointed Attorney 
General.63 Under this argument, the few past appointments of non-lawyer Attorneys 
General become rare exceptions to a convention instead of evidence that such 
appointments are lawful. Whether this argument is correct depends on the three-part 
test from the Patriation Reference as re-stated in Conacher v Canada (Prime 
Minister): “first, what are the precedents; second, did the actors in the precedents 
believe that they were bound by a rule; and third, is there a reason for the rule?”64 The 
first part of the test is clearly met, as there are numerous precedents. The third part, 
the reason for the rule, will become clear in Part 2 – in short, that the Attorney General 
can adequately uphold the rule of law and fulfill their other duties only if they are a 
lawyer. The second part of the test, whether the appointing premiers felt they were 
required to appoint only lawyers as Attorneys General, does not seem to be in serious 
doubt. In particular, why else would premiers almost always appoint lawyers as 
Attorneys General?65 The few exceptions would appear to prove the rule. 
 
While Askin was perhaps correct, and its underlying reasoning is presumably 
applicable across Canada, it nonetheless has undesirable legal and policy 
consequences. Before turning to these consequences, I note that insofar as the power 
of appointment at issue in Askin is indeed a prerogative power, it can be constrained 




61 Steele, supra note 5 at 8. 
62 See e.g. Interpretation Act, RSNS 1989, c 235, s 19(b): “In an enactment, …where power is given to the 
Governor in Council or a public officer to do or enforce the doing of any act, all necessary powers are also 
given to enable him to do or enforce the doing of the act”; Federal Interpretation Act, supra note 51, s 31(2): 
“Where power is given to a person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of any act or thing, all 
such powers as are necessary to enable the person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of the 
act or thing are deemed to be also given.”; Legislation Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 21, s 78: “If power to do or to 
enforce the doing of a thing is conferred on a person, all necessary incidental powers are included.” 
63 Askin, supra note 6, Application for Leave to Appeal at 34–46, Memorandum of Argument (31 July 2013) 
(Supreme Court of Canada, 35463) at paras 4046 [on file with author] [Askin SCC leave application]. 
64 Conacher v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 920 at para 37, aff’d 2010 FCA 131 at para 12, citing Re: 
Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753 at 888, 125 DLR (3d) 1 [Patriation Reference]. 
65 See above note 23 and accompanying text. See also Askin SCC leave application, supra note 63, at 65–
70 (four non-lawyers appointed Attorney General in the history of British Columbia, including the Attorney 
General whose appointment was being challenged), 71–77 (one non-lawyer (Acting) Attorney General in 
the history of Canada, including Upper Canada and Lower Canada). 
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Part 2: The legal and policy consequences of Askin 
 
In this Part, I assess the legal and policy consequences of Askin, consequences that on 
balance are negative for the government and for the public. While at first glance it may 
appear that the most important consequence is that the non-lawyer Attorney General 
lacks adequate legal training and experience, it is the discrete legal consequences that 
I argue are more problematic.  
 
Perhaps the most important legal consequence of Askin, at least for 
governments, is uncertainty over whether solicitor-client privilege applies to 
communications involving a non-lawyer Attorney General. While this point has never 
been decided by a court or tribunal, there is disagreement in the literature. Adam 
Dodek has argued that solicitor-client privilege would not apply, because a non-lawyer 
Attorney General is not a “professional legal advisor” following Wigmore’s test.66 In 
contrast, John Gregory has argued that the conduit exception applies to the non-lawyer 
Attorney General conveying advice from their Ministry to the Cabinet.67 Similarly to 
Gregory, Tom D. McKinlay argues that “Attorneys General rely almost exclusively 
on the legal advice prepared by the expert counsel employed in the Department of 
Justice. The communication of such advice would clearly be covered by solicitor-
client privilege, even if conveyed by an Attorney General who is not personally a 
lawyer…. [because] [s]olicitor-client privilege is not lost when it is communicated 
among non-lawyers within the government.”68 McKinlay nonetheless acknowledges 
that “in those rare cases that a non-lawyer Attorney General communicates their 
personal advice, divorced from the advice of his or her officials, … any question of 
privilege would arise”.69 In contrast, I have argued elsewhere that the Attorney General 
alone is a lawyer – i.e. a professional legal adviser – without being a member of the 
bar.70 Under my approach, their legal advice would be privileged whether or not they 
were conveying it from their departmental lawyers or providing it personally. This 
disagreement has yet to be resolved in the case law and, with respect to McKinlay, I 
am unconvinced that the issue “is largely academic”.71 
 
The most important legal consequence of Askin, in terms of the public 
interest, is that the non-lawyer Attorney General is not bound by the law of lawyering 
more generally, including but not limited to duties under the rules of professional 
conduct. Indeed, the law society has no regulatory authority over the non-lawyer 
 
66 Adam M Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at paras 4.28–4.34; 
Dodek, “Solicitor-Client Privilege”, supra note 37. 
67 Martin, “Confidentiality”, supra note 39 at 166–169. But see below note 83 and accompanying text.  
68 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Crown, “Crown Privilege: Solicitor-Client Privilege: The Solicitor” 
(IX.1.(2)) at HCW-22 “Non-Lawyer Attorney General” (2021 Re-issue) [citations omitted] [McKinlay]. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Martin, “Confidentiality”, supra note 39 at 166–169. 
71 McKinlay, supra note 68. 
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Attorney General and so its rules have no application to them.72 Admittedly, many of 
these professional duties are owed to the client, and the government as client is 
unlikely to complain to the law society about the Attorney General regardless – indeed, 
the premier has the immediate and ever-present option of simply removing the 
individual acting as Attorney General from Cabinet or shuffling them into another 
portfolio. Client complaints are admittedly not a formal prerequisite for law society 
investigation or discipline. Lawyers have other overarching duties than those owed to 
the client, including civility and the duty to encourage respect for the administration 
of justice.73 Sadly, not all Attorneys General have fulfilled these duties.74 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held in Krieger that law society authority over Crown 
prosecutors is necessary to protect the public interest.75 As I mentioned above, similar 
considerations would apply to the Attorney General.76 While even a lawyer Attorney 
General enjoys some statutory and constitutional immunities to law society discipline, 
those immunities are – and should be – narrow.77 It is for this reason that, as I 
mentioned above, I respectfully question the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that 
“[i]t is not necessary for the purpose of protecting the general public, the purpose of 
the Legal Profession Act, that the person appointed to the office of Attorney General 
be a member of the Law Society”.78 At the same time, I acknowledge the argument 
that law society jurisdiction over the Attorney General has an undesirable chilling 
effect over the execution of their duties.79 On balance, my view is that law society 
jurisdiction over the Attorney General, whether a lawyer or not, is an unavoidable 
element of the regulation of the legal profession in the public interest. Moreover, any 




72 Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Immunity of the Attorney General to Law Society Discipline” (2016) 94:2 
Can Bar Rev 413 at 426, n 60 [Martin, “Immunity”]. See also Krieger QB, supra note 23 at para 72: 
“Because of the fact that an Attorney General does not have to be a lawyer, that official may well escape 
the disciplinary scrutiny of the Legal Profession Act. That is of no concern because the intent and purpose 
of that Act is to control the standards of lawyers. It is not in any way concerned with the functions of the 
Attorney General as such. The Attorney General, although an Honourary Bencher, need not be a lawyer. An 
Attorney General, not a lawyer, would of course never be subject to any scrutiny by the Law Society. That 
situation is reasonable because the purpose of the Legal Profession Act is to govern the conduct of lawyers 
not that of Attorneys General.” 
73 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: FLSC, 2009, last 
amended 2019), rr 5.6-1, 7.2-1, online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada <www.flsc.ca> [FLSC Model 
Code].  
74 See e.g. Brent Cotter, “The Prime Minister v the Chief Justice of Canada: The Attorney General’s Failure 
of Responsibility” (2015) 18 Leg Ethics 73, discussing federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General 
Peter MacKay. 
75 Krieger SCC, supra note 23 at para 58. 
76 See above note 52. See also Martin, “Immunity”, supra note 72 at 443. 
77 Ibid at 422–439.  
78 See above note 16. 
79 Martin, “Immunity”, supra note 72 at 440–442. 
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An interesting consequence of Askin is that the non-lawyer Attorney General 
has no professional duty of competence.80 If I am correct that the non-lawyer Attorney 
General practices law despite not being a member of the law society,81 they may 
nonetheless be liable in negligence.82 However, the duty of care would be likely be 
owed solely to the client, and not to third parties or the public at large. The government 
would be unlikely to pursue an action in negligence against its own Attorney General 
– and even if it did so, it would likely be for political reasons. In contrast to the duty 
of care in negligence, the professional duty of competence is enforceable by the law 
society regardless of the wishes of the client. Following Askin, law societies would 
have no ability to discipline non-lawyer Attorneys General for incompetence, among 
other things. 
 
The practical consequence of Askin is that it permits the appointment of an 
Attorney General who, at least as a matter of training and experience, is unqualified 
for the role. Power in 1939 argued that it is inappropriate and anemic for a non-lawyer 
Attorney General to merely convey the advice of lawyers in their department: 
 
The attorney-general should not be a mere conduit of the opinions of others, 
and it is not possible for him to be anything but that if he is not learned in 
the law. In order to come to any conclusion really worth while he must have 
that instinct for the spirit of the law which can be acquired only from 
professional learning and experience, and, in order to weigh the opinions of 
his assistants and be qualified to discuss them and to convey the result which 
to his own mind follows from them he must be able to think in legal terms 
and to formulate his conclusions in accordance with those terms.83 
 
Brian Smith, on his resignation in 1988 as Attorney General for British Columbia, 
made a similar observation about non-lawyer Attorneys General: “I know from my 
experience that the Attorney-General requires considerable legal and constitutional 
sensibility in giving advice to government, or else the Attorney-General will simply 
be repeating, without understanding, the legal advice of others.”84 Recall also that the 
courts in Askin did not squarely address the petitioner’s submissions that a non-lawyer 
 
80 FLSC Model Code, supra note 73, r 3.1-2.  
81 Martin, “Confidentiality”, supra note 39 at 166–169. See above note 70 and corresponding text. 
82 I recognize that, as the Model Code emphasizes, the standard of competence is not identical to negligence. 
See FLSC Model Code, supra note 73, r 3.12, commentary 15: “This rule [competence] does not require a 
standard of perfection.  An error or omission, even though it might be actionable for damages in negligence 
or contract, will not necessarily constitute a failure to maintain the standard of professional competence 
described by the rule.” 
83 Power, supra note 30 at 426. 
84 British Columbia, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 34th Parl, 2nd Sess 
(28 June 1988) at 5498 (Hon BR Smith), online: <www.leg.bc.ca/documents-data/debate-transcripts/34th-
parliament/2nd-session/34p_02s_880628p>. Thanks to Adam Dodek for reminding me of this part of 
Smith’s speech. 
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Attorney General endangers both the public interest and the rights of individuals.85 
Moreover, the non-lawyer Attorney General has not been screened for character and 
integrity as have lawyers, although admittedly the utility of that screening is 
contested.86  
 
At the same time, any requirement that the Attorney General be a lawyer, 
even a lawyer in good standing, would be a meagre floor on competence and integrity, 
and certainly on experience – but a floor nonetheless. One might dream of a world-
class constitutional litigator like Ian Scott but end up with an undistinguished recent 
call.87 Power, though, somewhat poetically ended his analysis with the assertion that 
at least a lawyer can “envisage the ideal at which he should aim”.88  
 
In the abstract, all else equal, a lawyer Attorney General is arguably more 
effective than a non-lawyer Attorney General. In reality, however, a mediocre lawyer 
may be a failure and an otherwise exceptionally qualified non-lawyer may make a 
highly effective Attorney General. For example, former Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General for Canada, Anne McLellan, argued in 2018 that “thoughtful[ness]” 
and “good judgment” are more important for an Attorney General than being a 
lawyer.89 (McLellan would, however, go on to state in a 2019 report for the Prime 
Minister’s Office that “the federal [Attorney General and Minister of Justice] has 
always had legal training, and I believe that it is important to continue this tradition.”90) 
 
Indeed, some commentators argue that a non-lawyer Attorney General may 
be more effective than a lawyer – depending on how one defines effectiveness. For 
example, Omar Ha-Redeye writes that “[s]ometimes lengthy experience in a 
profession is the biggest obstacle to reforming that profession.”91 Similarly, former 
 
85 See above note 17. Contrast B Schwarz & D Rettie, “Interview with Rick Mantey: Exposing the Invisible” 
(2001) 28:2 Man LJ 187 at 191: “Did the whole administration of justice fall down when Jim McCrae [a 
non-lawyer] was the Attorney General? I don't think so.” 
86  See e.g. Alice Woolley, “Tending the Bar: The Good Character Requirement for Law Society Admission” 
(2007) 30 Dal LJ 27. 
87 See e.g. W Brent Cotter, “Ian Scott: Renaissance Man, Consummate Advocate, Attorney General 
Extraordinaire” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2015) 202. 
88 Power, supra note 30 at 429. 
89 Fatima Sayed, “Mulroney’s reputation ‘on the line’, say critics, if she won’t oppose Ford on 
notwithstanding clause” (18 August 2018), online: National Observer  
<www.nationalobserver.com/2018/09/18/news/mulroneys-reputation-line-say-critics-if-she-wont-oppose-
ford-notwithstanding-clause>. 
90 The Hon A Anne McLellan, Review of the Roles of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada 
(June 28, 2019) at 9 , online: Government of Canada  
<pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2019/08/14/review-roles-minister-justice-and-attorney-general-
canada> [McLellan]. With great respect to McLellan, in my view membership in the provincial Bar (or, at 
the federal level, membership in a provincial bar) is necessary as opposed to merely legal training. 
91 Ha-Redeye, supra note 36. See also comments by lawyer Clayton Ruby on the appointment of Marion 
Boyd as Attorney General for Ontario: "She brings a new perspective and I think that's hopeful…. The only 
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Ontario premier Bob Rae described his non-lawyer Attorney General, Marion Boyd, 
as “an advocate for change”.92 Boyd herself said of her appointment that “I think what 
we are saying -- and what the clear message from the government is -- is that the justice 
system is not the prerogative of the legal profession only.”93 Shirley Bond, whose 
appointment triggered Askin, suggested that “as a non-lawyer serving as Attorney 
General, I bring a common-sense approach that most British Columbians can 
appreciate”.94 More dramatically, Vic Toews argued that the adoption of 
administrative measures against impaired driving in Manitoba was easier because the 
non-lawyer Attorney General was not fixated on the requirements of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms:95 
 
From the onset the greatest impediment to the development of this 
administrative program was the objection by the legal community, 
including my colleagues in the Manitoba Department of Justice, that this 
initiative should not be pursued because it violated the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms…. The advantage that we had in developing this program 
for the Province of Manitoba was that our Attorney General was not a 
lawyer; rather, he could have been a model for the archetypal reasonable 
man we used to read about in law school. His focus was not so much on 
the Charter objections to the program that the legal community was intent 
on providing but on finding a mechanism to protect the lives and property 
of the people of Manitoba.96 
 
Admittedly, a fixation on the Charter – even an undue one – might not be considered 
a disadvantage by some. Contrast here Boyd, the non-lawyer Attorney General for 
Ontario, who wanted her lawyers to confirm the constitutionality of such impaired-
driving measures before she recommended them.97 A more fundamental concern than 
 
question is, can she understand the legal issues? If she's bright, she'll have no difficulty." (Paul Moloney, 
“Minister's lack of legal training may be an asset, lawyers say”, The Toronto Star (4 February 1993) A11.) 
92 Bob Rae, From Protest to Power: Personal Reflections on a Life in Politics (Toronto: Viking, 1996) at 
251. 
93 Tom Onyshko, “Ontario's new Attorney General has ambitious plans for reform”, The Lawyers Weekly 
12:40 (26 February 1993) (QL). See also Monique Conrod, “'We didn't think there would be any problem. 
We really didn't.' Bill 167 defeat was major disappointment for Boyd”, The Lawyers Weekly 15:5 (2 June 
1995) (QL), quotinig Boyd: “I think the perspective that someone who's a layperson, a lay advocate, a 
feminist, and someone who has worked on social justice issues previous to being attorney general, is very 
important to focus attention on some parts of the job that may not have had as much attention in the past, 
and at a time when the general public is looking to the justice system from the perspective of: How does it 
serve the general public? Is it only focused on issues that the legal profession itself is interested in, or is it 
really focused on providing justice for the general population? So I think it was an ideal time for a new 
perspective to come to the job.” 
94 Jeremy Hainsworth, “B.C. ministry merger assailed”, The Lawyers Weekly 31:48 (27 April 2012). 
95 Charter, supra note 57. 
96 Vic Toews, “The Charter in Canadian Society” (2003) 19 SCLR (2d) 345 at 347–348. (Now Justice 
Toews of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench.) 
97 See e.g. Editorial, “Consulting Unlimited”, The Toronto Star (22 February 1995) A20: “Last November, 
she pronounced herself in favor of a 90-day licence suspension for drivers accused of impaired driving. But 
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that of Toews is that the Attorney General cannot properly oversee the profession, 
including the law society and its enabling legislation, unless they are independent from 
that profession and immune to regulation by that law society.98 
 
The most important policy consideration is that a lawyer is more likely to 
understand and appreciate the unique role of the Attorney General than a non-lawyer. 
Such an understanding and appreciation is even more important when they are cross-
appointed to other portfolios and in jurisdictions where public safety remains part of 
the Ministry of Justice, as their other duties and pressures can interfere with their duties 
as Attorney General.99 Particularly concerning is a non-lawyer Premier who appoints 
themself as Attorney General, as did E.C. Manning of Alberta in 1955.100 Puzzlingly, 
Manning would later observe that “I felt that if anybody was going to serve as Attorney 
General who was not a lawyer, there would be more public acceptance of it if I did it 
myself as premier.”101 Such a dual portfolio can be disastrous for the rule of law even 
where the Premier and Attorney General is a lawyer, as demonstrated by the conduct 
of Quebec’s Maurice Duplessis in the classic case of Roncarelli v Duplessis.102 While 
Attorney General for Ontario, Ian Scott wrote in 1989 that “[i]t is understood in our 
province that the attorney general is first and foremost the chief law officer of the 
Crown, and that the powers and duties of that office take precedence over any others 
that may derive from his additional role as minister of justice and member of 
Cabinet.”103 This understanding is all the more important when the Attorney General 
holds other portfolios. 
 
In sum, while the Attorney General should arguably be a lawyer as a matter 
of policy, at least as a general rule, that argument is contested. Moreover, even if that 
argument is correct, it does not follow that the Attorney General must be a lawyer as 
a matter of law. Indeed, Askin holds the opposite. Nonetheless, there are significant 
adverse legal consequences to the appointment of a non-lawyer Attorney General. 
Most concerning for governments is that solicitor-client privilege may not apply. In 
 
Boyd - not a lawyer herself - said she just wanted to have her legal advisers double-check the 
constitutionality of the idea, even though Manitoba already has implemented it.” 
98 See e.g. Martin, “Immunity”, supra note 72 at 437, 438. 
99 See e.g. Murphy, supra note 27 at 9. 
100 See e.g. Kilgour, supra note 24 at 141 (mentioning Manning but not acknowledging any concern).  
101 Brian Brennan, The Good Steward: The Ernest C. Manning Story (Calgary: Fifth House 2008) at 126. 
See also Barry L Strayer, Canada’s Constitutional Revolution (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 
2013) at 8: “It was said of Mr. Manning, who of course was not a lawyer, that he did not have enough faith 
in any lawyer to entrust him with the role of Attorney General.” 
102 Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689, concerning Quebec Premier and Attorney 
General Maurice Duplessis, as noted e.g. in Huscroft, supra note 25 at 132, n 29. See also Keating, supra 
note 41 at 16:33 to 16:35. For a detailed analysis, see Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Premier Should Not 
Also Be the Attorney General: Roncarelli v Duplessis Revisited as a Cautionary Tale in Legal Ethics and 
Professionalism” (2021) 44 Man LJ [forthcoming]. 
103 The Honourable Ian Scott, “Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy and Change 
in the 1980s” (1989) 39:2 UTLJ 109 at 122. 
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contrast, what should be most concerning for the public, and most concerning for 
legislatures and governments insofar as their role is to protect the public interest, is 
that the law of lawyering does not fully apply, if it applies at all. 
 
 
Part 3: Options for reform 
 
As I explained in Parts 1 and 2, Askin – even if correctly decided – has undesirable 
legal and policy consequences. In this Part, I consider options for reform. Insofar as 
the holding in Askin is an application of the Crown prerogative, there is no legal 
impediment to legislatures changing the law through legislation. Thus the adverse 
legal consequences of Askin can be fixed. Further, the recognition of a constitutional 
convention that only lawyers be appointed as Attorney General would address the 
adverse policy consequences. 
 
One option, as always, is to do nothing. As described above,104 the most 
serious legal consequence of a non-lawyer Attorney General for the government is 
Dodek’s argument that solicitor-client privilege does not apply. However, there is as 
yet no case in which this argument has been accepted. Moreover, counterarguments 
are available. The other legal consequences of Askin may be unimportant or not 
pressing, at least to legislators. This do-nothing option is the easiest but is certainly 
not recommended. 
 
A second and superficially simple option is to require by statute that the 
Attorney General be a lawyer in good standing with the provincial law society. Indeed, 
Power explains that such amendments were proposed, but rejected, in Alberta in the 
late 1930s.105 This option would fix the legal consequences of Askin. However, this 
option leaves no recourse in situations where there are no lawyers in the caucus of the 
governing party. Moreover, this option would compromise the freedom of the Premier 
to select their Cabinet, which freedom is desirable in itself and, regardless, is central 
to the Canadian system of responsible government. The Premier may have good – or, 
admittedly, bad – reasons to choose a non-lawyer Attorney General. While Keating 
suggests that if no lawyer-legislator is available, a lawyer who is not an elected 
legislator can be appointed Attorney General,106 I disagree that such an appointment 
could be reconciled with responsible government.107 (Such an appointment would be 
less problematic if the position of Attorney General were removed from Cabinet, but 
such a reform is well beyond the scope of this article.) 
 
 
104 See above note 66 and accompanying text. 
105 Power, supra note 30 at 417. 
106 Keating, supra note 41 at 52:12 to 52:29. 
107 See e.g. Steele, supra note 5 at 8: “It is constitutionally permissible to appoint non-MLAs to Cabinet, but 
that option creates a raft of other issues having to do with responsible government.”  
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A third option, and one that would fix the legal consequences of Askin 
without impeding the freedom of the Premier to select their cabinet, is both to require 
the Attorney General to be a lawyer in good standing with the provincial law society 
and to require the law society to admit any person appointed as Attorney General. One 
model here is the Ontario Barristers Act, which provides that the federal or provincial 
Attorney General may join the Ontario bar without meeting the admission 
requirements,108 but does not require the federal Attorney General or provincial 
Attorney General to do so. If the goal post-Askin is to ensure that the non-lawyer 
Attorney General is bound by the law of lawyering, it is not enough to allow the 
Attorney General to become a lawyer; instead, the Attorney General must be required 
to become a lawyer.109 
  
I recognize that a requirement to admit the non-lawyer Attorney General is, 
at least at first glance, an imposition on the independence of the law society. However, 
recall that the non-lawyer Attorney General practices law.110 From this perspective, 
imposing this requirement on the law society merely completes, or fills a gap in, its 
statutory mandate to regulate the practice of law in the public interest and ensures it 
can meet that mandate. Indeed, without such a requirement, the law society is 
prevented from meeting – or, more cynically, permitted to abdicate – its statutory 
mandate. In terms of the regulation of the profession and the law of lawyering, it is 
better that the Attorney General be a completely unqualified lawyer than a non-lawyer. 
 
I argue that the best option is a fourth one: to amend provincial legislation to 
deem that the Attorney General is a member of the corresponding law society so long 
as they remain Attorney General. This option would fix the legal consequences of 
Askin without in any way impeding the freedom of the Premier to select their Cabinet, 
while impairing little if at all the independence of the law society or compromising the 
qualifications required to become a lawyer. 
 
108 Barristers Act, RSO 1990, c B.3, s 1, as amended by Accelerating Access to Justice Act, 2021, Sched 1, 
s 1. Note that prior to this amendment in April 2021, this provision oddly applied only to the federal Attorney 
General and not the provincial Attorney General. The addition of the provincial Attorney General to this 
provision, as well as the larger issue of non-lawyers Attorney General, was largely ignored during the 
legislative debates, although one opposition legislator did ask “Why give the Attorney General that power? 
How does it serve the people of this province?” – though the question was left unanswered: Ontario, 
Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 42-1, No 228 (1 March 2021) at 11660 
(Catherine Fife), online: <www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-42/session-
1/2021-03-01/hansard> [Fife] (See also Fife’s unanswered questions about how the provision was related 
to the purported topic of the bill, i.e. access to justice: 11657, 11660). 
109 I note here that, based on the wording of the Barristers Act, supra note 108, there is some residual 
uncertainty over whether an Attorney General admitted under that provision would be subject to the 
disciplinary jurisdiction of the law society (although on reflection I think that uncertainty was overblown): 
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation of Federal Government 
Lawyers” (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ 363 at 385–386 [Martin, "Federalism”]. While that uncertainty was raised in 
the context of the federal Attorney General, now that this provision has been extended to apply to provincial 
Attorneys General, the same uncertainty would apply to provincial Attorneys General called under that 
provision. 
110 See e.g. note 70 and accompanying text.  




An important consequence of making or deeming the non-lawyer Attorney 
General a lawyer is that they would have an identifiable duty to encourage respect for 
the administration of justice.111 For my purposes, it is worth emphasizing that this duty 
does not prohibit criticism of lawyers, judges, or courts – indeed, it may often require 
such criticism.112 Instead, this duty mandates only that such criticism be fair “bona fide 
and reasoned”, not “petty, intemperate or unsupported”.113 While a naïve romantic 
might hope that all politicians would do so, this expectation seems appropriate of at 
least the Attorney General. The professional duty of civility would likewise apply to 
such criticism, at least nominally.114 Post-Groia, however, litigation is not a “tea 
party”115 to which a robust expectation of civility applies – and if anything, politics is 
less likely to attract a robust expectation of civility than litigation. There is thus little 
reason to suspect that a non-lawyer under my proposals will enthusiastically embrace 
their newfound duty of civility. However, the existence of a duty to encourage respect 
for the administration of justice has normative force in itself – even if that duty remains 
unenforced. 
 
One seemingly problematic consequence is that, if made or deemed a lawyer, 
the non-lawyer Attorney General would have a professional duty of competence – a 
duty it would seem they have no chance of fulfilling themself.116 However, the non-
lawyer Attorney General, like all lawyers, can fulfill their duty of competence by 
“obtain[ing] the client’s instructions to retain, consult or collaborate with a lawyer who 
is competent for that task”.117 Thus, their lawyers can assist them in fulfilling that duty 
of competence. Importantly, fulfilling this duty requires the non-lawyer Attorney 
General to consider the advice of their lawyers, and apparently to follow that advice 
unless they have a good basis for rejecting it. 
 
Perhaps the most undesirable consequence of deeming or making the non-
lawyer Attorney General into a member of the law society is that they would have the 
right to appear as counsel in court. They should resist that temptation. Indeed, even a 
lawyer appointed Attorney General must be thoughtful and deliberate in their court 
 
111 FLSC Model Code, supra note 73, r 5.6-1. 
112 Ibid, r 5.6-1, commentary 3. 
113 Ibid, r 5.6-1, commentaries 3, 4. 
114 Ibid, r 7.2-1. See also r 7.2-4: “A lawyer must not, in the course of a professional practice, send 
correspondence or otherwise communicate to a client, another lawyer or any other person in a manner that 
is abusive, offensive, or otherwise inconsistent with the proper tone of a professional communication from 
a lawyer.” 
115 Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27 at para 3: “trials are not — nor are they meant to 
be — tea parties.” Although, as a potential floor, see Karahalios v Conservative Party of Canada, 2020 
ONSC 3145 at para 262: “Litigation is not an MMA match where one calls out his opponent and dares him 
or her to enter the courtroom.” 
116 FLSC Model Code, supra note 73, r 3.1-2. 
117 Ibid, r 3.1-2, commentary 6(b). 
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appearances.118 Any such appearance by a non-lawyer Attorney General would 
suggest at least hubris, if not, as Justice Rosenberg (writing extrajudicially about 
lawyer Attorneys General) warned, that they are “[u]sing the court process to push a 
personal or political agenda”.119 
 
If the chilling effect of law society jurisdiction over the Attorney General is 
considered a legitimate concern, then one of these options could be combined with an 
immunity provision like that on the Attorney General under the Ontario Law Society 
Act.120 This combination would solve the problem of solicitor-client privilege without 
subjecting the Attorney General to that part of the law of lawyering that is enforced by 
the law society. 
 
What about federally? The implications of Askin are less of a concern 
federally because, as a matter of federalism, provincial law cannot require the Attorney 
General for Canada – or indeed any person providing legal services to the federal 
government – to be a lawyer.121 While Parliament could displace the prerogative and 
require the federal Attorney General to be a lawyer, i.e. to be a member of a provincial 
bar, Parliament would have no power to concomitantly require any provincial bar to 
admit them as one. Nonetheless, section 1 of the Ontario Barristers Act guarantees the 
admission of the federal Attorney General to the Ontario Bar. Parliament could deem 
or require the Attorney General to be a lawyer, at least for the purposes of matters 
within federal jurisdiction, which deeming or requirement under section 91(8) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 – federal power over officers and employees of the federal 
government – would likely prevail over provincial legislation via paramountcy.122 
Indeed, as at the provincial level, my recommendation is that Parliament adopt 
legislation deeming the Attorney General for Canada to be a member of at least one 
provincial or territorial bar. Given that the seat of government is Ottawa, and that the 
Ontario Barristers Act allows the federal Attorney General to become a member of the 
Ontario bar, it might appear to make the most sense for Parliament to choose the 
Ontario bar. However, to ensure the law of lawyering applied to the Attorney General 
evenly across the country, the best approach would be for Parliament to deem the 
Attorney General to be a member of every provincial and territorial bar. 
 
The modified Barristers Act approach – in which the law society is required 
to admit the Attorney General and they are required to join it – has both advantages 
and disadvantages insofar as the Attorney General remains a member of the law 
society after they cease to be Attorney General, at least until they apply for permission 
to surrender their license. An advantage is that the law society has regulatory and 
 
118 The Honourable Marc Rosenberg, “The Attorney General and the Administration of Criminal Justice” 
(2009) 34:2 Queen’s LJ 813 at 846–849. 
119 Ibid at 848. 
120 Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, s 13(3). See e.g. Martin, “Immunity”, supra note 72 at 431–433. 
121 Martin, “Federalism”, supra note 109 at 374–383. 
122 Ibid at 386–389, esp 388 on 91(8); Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 58. 
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disciplinary authority over them while they are Attorney General and retains that 
authority after they leave the portfolio.123 In contrast, under the deeming approach, 
they would be removed from law society jurisdiction by ceasing to be Attorney 
General. This difference admittedly may be an insignificant or largely hypothetical 
one, given the reality that law societies seem unlikely to discipline Attorneys General 
regardless.124 (A slightly more complex legislative solution would be to specify that 
the law society retains permanent disciplinary jurisdiction over conduct while deemed 
to be Attorney General.) Under either approach, however, courts would maintain 
authority over any breaches of law by the non-lawyer Attorney General, such as a 
breach of their lawyerly fiduciary duty to the client, even after they cease to be 
Attorney General. 
 
On the other hand, a disadvantage to this modified Barristers Act approach is 
that, after leaving office, the former Attorney General has the lifetime ability to 
practice law despite having no legal training – posing a substantial risk to potential 
clients. This lifetime ability to practice law could also be seen as a gratuitous, arbitrary, 
and undeserved “perk”,125 which is the antithesis of my purpose. Indeed, if this 
granting of a “perk” to non-lawyer Attorneys General was the intended purpose of this 
amendment to the Barristers Act, as suggested during the legislative debates,126 then 
with respect the government and the Attorney General either overlooked or did not 
appropriately appreciate the important legal issues and law society independence 
considerations involved – as well as the importance of the public understanding and 
perception of the motivation and rationale for this change. 
 
Another option would be to split the roles of the Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General,127 and to only require or deem the latter to be a member of the law 
society. As Adam Dodek argues, “[w]e need to have a minister of justice who is 
responsible for justice policy in the same way that the minister of health is responsible 
for health policy. But it is not apparent that we need a lawyer in this role any more 
than we need a doctor as minister of health, a farmer as minister of agriculture or a 
teacher as minister of education.”128 While this splitting at the federal level was not 
endorsed in the recent Review of the Roles of the Minister of Justice and Attorney 
 
123 But see note 109. 
124 Consider again here Peter MacKay. 
125 Fife, supra note 107 at 11656, 11660.  
126 Barristers Act, supra note 108; Fife supra note 108 at 116660: “Tell me why giving the Attorney General 
the right and the authorization for current and former Attorneys General to be called to the Ontario bar 
without having to meet law society licensing requirements—and he calls this a perk.” 
127 See e.g. Adam Dodek, “The impossible position: Canada’s attorney-general cannot be our justice 
minister” (22 February 2019), online: The Globe and Mail  
<www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-impossible-position-canadas-attorney-general-cannot-be-
our/> [Dodek, “Impossible Position”]. See also Murphy, supra note 27 at 14. 
128 Dodek, “Impossible Position”, supra note 127. 
278 UNBLJ    RD UN-B   [VOL/TOME 72 
 
 
General of Canada,129 it warrants careful consideration both federally and 
provincially. Under this approach, the Attorney General could be subject to law society 
authority, for the necessary reasons explained above, while the Minister of Justice 
could be free from that authority, avoiding the accompanying constraints. 
 
As for the policy consequences of Askin, here Askin’s constitutional 
convention argument is intriguing and potentially effective. A constitutional 
convention that only lawyers be appointed as Attorney General would recognize the 
applicable policy considerations without making them legally enforceable, while 
serving as a strong signal to premiers that there may be political fallout for appointing 
a non-lawyer. Any premier who concluded that the appointment of a non-lawyer was 
the best option despite this disincentive would be free to choose that option. The 
prerogative power would thus be constrained as a matter of politics but not as a matter 
of law. Alongside my other recommendations, legislatures should consider adopting 
legislation or passing motions purporting to recognize a constitutional convention that 
only lawyers be appointed as Attorney General. While the formal recognition of a 
constitutional convention is a matter for the courts,130 such a declaration by the 
legislatures would be meaningful evidence in itself. 
 
 
Reflections and conclusion 
 
In this article I have analyzed the legal and policy consequences of the non-lawyer 
Attorney General. In doing so, I both demonstrated that Askin has received little 
attention in the case law and the literature and argued that it warrants more. Aside from 
the weaknesses in its reasoning, Askin has problematic legal implications. Chief 
among these implications is the non-application of solicitor-client privilege and of the 
law of lawyering. The best way to overcome the legal implications of Askin without 
affecting the freedom of the Premier to choose their cabinet is to amend provincial 
legislation to deem that the Attorney General is a member of the provincial law society 
so long as they hold that portfolio. (At the federal level, Parliament should likewise 
legislatively deem the Attorney General for Canada to be a member of all provincial 
and territorial bars.) This approach is preferable to the guaranteed but voluntary call 
in the Ontario Barristers Act, which among other things does not require the non-
lawyer Attorney General to join the law society, detracts from the independence of the 
law society to control admission to the bar in the public interest, and can be seen as 
granting an arbitrary and gratuitous lifetime perk.131 The intention of my 
recommendations is not to benefit the non-lawyer Attorney General but to protect the 
interests of the government as client, the public interest, and the ability of the law 
society to fulfill its statutory mandate.  
 
129 McLellan, supra note 90 at 31. 
130 Patriation Reference, supra note 64 at 853. I note that Power, supra note 30 at 422–423, though not 
considering a constitutional convention, gives little weight to “tradition and custom” in itself. 
131 Fife, supra note 108 at 11656, 11660. See above note 125 and accompanying text. 




Indeed, to leave the law societies unable to regulate non-lawyer Attorneys 
General is to hobble their ability to protect the public interest and public confidence in 
the administration of justice. To insert the law societies, at least in theory, into politics 
in this way is admittedly inconvenient if not dangerous for the independence and self-
regulation of the legal profession – law societies may indeed be “content” with the 
status quo.132 Nonetheless, the ability to regulate all Attorneys General is ultimately 
unavoidable to properly fulfill law societies’ statutory mandate. Under any approach, 
the law societies seem in reality unlikely to investigate or discipline the non-lawyer 
Attorney General – or for that matter, any Attorney General. While that reality is 
disillusioning, I leave that disillusionment for another day.  
 
The importance of the changes I have recommended is nonetheless much 
more than symbolic. The largely theoretical potential for discipline is not the only 
driver for compliance with legal obligations; there is a normative and political force 
to those obligations. As John Edwards observed in a slightly different context, the 
ultimate backstop for any Attorney General to act properly is their character and 
integrity.133 This reality is, if anything, even more true for a non-lawyer Attorney 
General. To subject the non-lawyer Attorney General to the professional and legal 
obligations of all lawyers is, one would hope, to impress those obligations upon their 
integrity. If nothing else, there could potentially be political ramifications if a non-
lawyer Attorney General did not meet these obligations. Such ramifications would be 
reinforced by recognizing a constitutional convention that only lawyers be appointed 
as Attorney General.  
 
In any case, legislative clarity that these obligations apply to the non-lawyer 
Attorney General, via a clear statement of the legislature on behalf of the public, is a 
first step in actualizing them and raising public expectations. Such legislation would 
emphasize that the legislature will (or can or should) hold even the non-lawyer 
Attorney General to a higher standard than it does other members of cabinet. It would 
provide a clear and articulable basis, although some might characterize this as a fig-
leaf, for calls for the non-lawyer Attorney General to resign. 
 
An analogy can be drawn here to the recent recommendation by Anne 
McLellan to create a special oath of office for the Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General of Canada, one that would among other things explicitly acknowledge a duty 
 
132 See note 11. See also Murphy, supra note 27 at 11: the failure of the law society to take jurisdiction is 
“disconcerting”. 
133 John Ll J Edwards, The Attorney-General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1984) at 69, quoted e.g. in McLellan, supra note 90 at 11: “in the final analysis it is the strength of character, 
personal integrity and depth of commitment to the principles of independence and the impartial 
representation of the public interest, on the part of the holders of the office of Attorney General, which is of 
supreme importance.” See also Murphy, supra note 27 at 7: “the implementation of the Rule of Law which 
is so critical to the integrity of our democratic system of government depends entirely on the integrity of the 
person holding the position of Attorney General.” Again, as a counterpoint see Peter MacKay. 
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to the rule of law.134 McLellan argued that such an oath would “clarify” the role for 
the Attorney General both for herself and for others.135 The legislative amendments I 
recommend would serve a similar function. I also echo McLellan’s position that such 
changes are “not a purely symbolic gesture” and could, if nothing else, support the 
Attorney General’s resignation after a breach.136 
 
There is a clear role for the profession, if not the public, to push for 
clarification and change. As suggested by Keating, the Canadian Bar Association and 
its branches should encourage the Federation of Law Societies of Canada and its 
member law societies to adopt and make public a clear position on their actual and 
preferable jurisdiction over the non-lawyer Attorney General – and encourage 
Parliament and the legislatures to act on the recommendations proposed above. 
 
While the implications of Askin are problematic, my view is that an absolute 
rule that only lawyers can be appointed as Attorney General would be problematic in 
a different way. At minimum, Askin is problematic in that it allows the appointment 
of an Attorney General who is unqualified as a matter of education, training, and 
experience. While a bare requirement to be a lawyer does not guarantee much, it does 
provide a minimum measure of preparation for the role. A deeper question is whether 
the non-lawyer Attorney General can truly appreciate, understand, and fulfill their 
duties to the rule of law – as its “protector” or “lore master”.137 The non-lawyer 
Attorney General is unduly reliant on the judgment of the lawyers who advise them – 
unless they reject that judgment, as espoused by Toews, which is not much better. As 
Murphy notes, “the Attorney General is not merely a figurehead.”138 On the other 
hand, I acknowledge the argument that a lawyer Attorney General is beholden to the 
legal profession, if not to the law society itself, and cannot effectively oversee that 
profession and that law society while simultaneously being a member of that 
profession and a licensee of that law society. On balance, the freedom of the Premier 
or Prime Minister to choose their Attorney General outweighs the benefits of requiring 
them to choose a lawyer. Thus, while I agree that the Attorney General should 
generally be a lawyer before their appointment, I disagree that there should be a legal 
 
134 McLellan, supra note 90 at 42: “I propose we develop a Canadian oath which refers specifically to the 
Attorney General’s unique role in upholding the rule of law, giving independent legal advice, and making 
decisions about prosecutions independently.” 
135 Ibid at 42. 
136 Ibid at 43. 
137 Kent Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of the Rule of Law” 
(2006) 31:2 Queen’s LJ 598 at 600: “the Attorney General is not simply the government's lawyer, but the 
protector of the rule of law within government” [emphasis added]; Boucher, supra note 41 at 465 [citations 
omitted, emphasis in original]: “While it is correct and perhaps convenient to describe the Attorney 
General’s role as that of custodian of the rule of law, guardian of the rule of law or guardian of the public 
interest, it is more practical to describe him or her as the exclusive interpreter of the rule of law, a role 
which, in a fit of whimsy, I have dubbed Lore Master of the Rule of Law.” 
138 Murphy, supra note 27 at 12–13. 
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requirement to that effect – although I do advocate the recognition of a corresponding 
constitutional convention. 
 
While there is no way to overcome the negative policy consequences of a 
non-lawyer Attorney General – i.e. that they are unavoidably untrained and 
unqualified in a technical sense, and their integrity has not been assessed by the 
corresponding law society, and they lack a lawyer’s understanding and appreciation 
of the rule of law – my proposals do overcome the legal consequences. In doing so, 
they also provide a clear and objective and rigorous standard for the non-lawyer 
Attorney General to meet. Premiers are free to appoint non-lawyers as Attorneys 
General, and eliminating that freedom itself would be problematic. At the same time, 
both appointer and appointee should bear the consequences of that choice, be they 
positive or negative. The public should expect more of Attorneys General, be they 
lawyers or non-lawyers, and – if nothing else – my proposal is a reasonable way to set 
and affirm those expectations. It is also a clear direction to law societies that regulating 
the legal profession in the public interest must mean regulating the Attorney General. 
I emphasize that to leave the chief legal officer of the Crown beyond law society 
authority, in law or in reality, is to require or allow law societies to abdicate their 
responsibility.
